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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                
NO. 01-4407
                
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
GERALD WEIR,
Appellant
               
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Crim. 99-cr-00705-1)
District Judge:  Hon. Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr.
               
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 9, 2002
Before:  SLOVITER, RENDELL, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
(Filed : September 19, 2002 )
                
OPINION OF THE COURT
2SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
I.
Facts and Procedural History
Appellant Gerald Weir, an attorney, was the president and 50% owner of Capital
Resources Corporation (CRC), a mortgage broker and sales financing corporation licensed
in New Jersey to sell first and second mortgages.  CRC was affiliated with Capital Financial
Corporation (later changed to Capital Homeowners Corporation (CHC)) and Ready Capital
Corporation (RCC), two companies engaged in originating residential first and second
mortgage loans in New York and Rhode Island respectively.  CRC would often purchase
first mortgages from CHC and RCC which it then sold to banks pursuant to Loan
Agreements under which, for a fee, it collected the principal and interest payments from
the borrowers on behalf of the bank.  CRC agreed to repurchase from the bank  any loans
that became more than ninety days delinquent.  CRC was obliged to track the borrowers’
payment history and issue monthly delinquency reports to the banks to show the status of
each loan.
On or about May 1984, a number of loans became more than ninety days delinquent
but CRC did not have enough money in its operating account to repurchase all of the
delinquent loans.  Weir directed CRC to make monthly payments to the banks on the
delinquent borrowers’ behalf (called “perfect pays”) and to generate false monthly
delinquency reports to the banks to conceal the borrowers’ delinquencies.  This continued
until December 1989 when, due in part to CRC’s practice of making monthly payments on
     1 The record does not indicate why it took the government ten years to charge Weir
with these crimes.  The crimes of bank fraud and issuing false statements to banks do not
contain statute of limitations provisions, and Weir did not raise a statute of limitations
issue as an affirmative defense.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
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behalf of its delinquent borrowers, CRC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  Knowing that
CRC’s financial records could be subject to examination by the bankruptcy trustee, CRC
prepared accurate delinquency statements for the month of December which showed that
CRC owed nine banks over $15 million for the repurchase of delinquent loans.
The bankruptcy relieved CRC of its obligation to buy back the hundreds of
delinquent mortgage loans it was obligated to repurchase.  As a result, the banks had to
service the loans themselves or recover those losses by filing bankruptcy claims or by
selling or foreclosing on the real property securing the loans.
In November 1999, Weir pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to an information
charging him with one count of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1344, and nine counts of issuing
false statements to financial institutions, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1014.1   The parties also agreed to
the following: (1) that section 2F1.1 of the 2000 Sentencing Guidelines applied to Weir’s
fraud offense, which provided a base offense level of six; (2) that Weir’s fraud did not
cause a loss of more than $1,500,000, which under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(M) limited the
increase in Weir’s offense to no more than eleven additional levels; (3) that a two-level
enhancement for more than minimal planning applied, see U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A); (4)
that a three-level downward adjustment was appropriate under U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1 (a) and (b)
(2); and (5) that Weir did not abuse a position of trust or use a special skill in committing
4the crimes, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3.  The sentencing judge was not bound by the plea
agreement and was able to exercise his discretion with respect to Weir’s sentence.  Weir
retained the right to argue the issue of sentencing in the plea agreement because “the
government had not provided the documentary basis for its loss calculation.”  Br. of
Appellant at 4.
The District Court held extensive sentencing hearings on the issue of loss
calculation under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b) (2000) (deleted 2001).  Citing letters it received
from seven banks who were defrauded by Weir, the Government initially asserted that Weir
was responsible for a loss of $929,494.94.  However, after Weir claimed that the
Government’s loss analysis failed to credit the banks with payments they received from the
bankruptcy court, from sales of defaulted mortgages, and from foreclosure sales of
delinquent properties, the Government reduced its loss calculation to $629,228.00.
At the sentencing hearings, FBI Special Agent Nicholas Zubulake and FBI Financial
Analyst Peter Wong testified for the Government.  Donald T. Faber, who was  appointed by
the bankruptcy court in 1990 as a certified public accountant for CRC, testified for the
defense on the issue of loss as an expert in the field of accounting.
During the sentencing hearings, the District Court further reduced the Government’s
claim of loss, finding that two of the banks had been fully compensated through bankruptcy
distributions and three other banks were fully compensated by the resale of real property
securing various loans.  Only two banks remained in the loss calculation: Guttenberg
Savings and Loan (Guttenberg) and Fitchburg Savings and Loan (Fitchburg).  The
5Government argued that sentencing Weir based on only two banks’ losses would
underestimate the seriousness of Weir’s conduct, see U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, and moved for a
three-level upward departure to Weir’s sentence.
The Government initially had claimed that Guttenberg sustained a loss of
$207,237.06 and that Fitchburg sustained a loss of $75,862.22, but the District Court, after
considering the bankruptcy distributions and foreclosure sales of delinquent loans, reduced
Guttenberg’s loss to $80,400 and Fitchburg’s loss to $52,054.94, a total loss figure of
$132,454.94.  Although Weir sought further reduction based on the “interest differential,”
CRC’s overpayments, and the banks’ failure to send representatives to various foreclosure
sales to minimize their losses, the District Court rejected this request.  In light of its
determination that the total loss was $132,454.94, the District Court placed Weir’s total
offense level at 13.  See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(H) (2000) (deleted 2001) (providing a
seven-level increase to the base offense level of six for a loss between $120,000 and
$200,000).
The District Court also granted the Government’s upward departure motion pursuant
to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1.  The court found that because Weir’s fraud involved twenty-two banks
and hundreds of false reports, a loss of $132,454.94 underestimated the seriousness of
Weir’s conduct.  The District Court thus applied a three-level upward departure, raising
Weir’s offense level to sixteen, and sentenced Weir to twenty-one months in prison on
each of the ten counts to be served concurrently and a five-year supervisory release.  The
court also ordered Weir to pay $2000 restitution to each of five banks, including
6Guttenberg and Fitchburg.
Weir requested the District Court to amend its sentence pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.
35(c), arguing that the court’s refusal to deduct the “uncollected interest” from the loss
amount was in error.  App. at 46.  Weir argued that his offense level would be reduced from
sixteen to fifteen and his requisite prison sentence would be reduced from 21 to 27 months
to 18 to 24 months.  The District Court denied Weir’s motion to amend the sentence, but
released Weir on bail pending appeal to this court.
II.
Discussion
This court has jurisdiction, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742, to review a sentence
imposed under the sentencing guidelines.
We exercise plenary review of the district court’s interpretation of “loss” under the
sentencing guidelines.  United States v. Maurello, 76 F.3d 1304, 1308 (3d Cir. 1996). 
However, the district court’s decision regarding the applicability of an adjustment under the
sentencing guidelines “depends on the mixture of fact and law necessary to that court’s
determination.”  United States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061, 1064 (3d Cir. 1990).  If the
district court’s decision is based on “essentially factual” grounds, we will reverse only for
clear error.  Id.  If the claimed error is a matter of law, this court must review the district
court’s decision de novo.  Id.
Weir raises three issues with respect to calculation of loss in the fraud context.  If
we were to accept all of Weir’s asserted reductions, the total loss would be zero and his
7offense level would be reduced to six (0-6 months in prison).  Taking them seriatim, we
first consider Weir’s claim that both Guttenberg and Fitchburg negligently failed to send a
representative to various foreclosure sales, which would have allowed the banks to
minimize their claimed losses due to Weir’s fraud.  We reject the claim and agree with the
Government that the issue is the amount of the victim’s actual loss, “not the quality of the
victim’s efforts to mitigate the loss.”  Br. of Appellee at 25.  See United States v. Kopp,
951 F.2d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 1991).  Second, Weir claims that both Guttenberg and
Fitchburg kept “interest overpayments” – extra interest paid to the banks in February 1989
due to a computer glitch in issuing perfect pays – and that this overpayment should be used
to reduce the banks’ loss claim.  There is no reason to do so as the issue is actual loss
rather than loss from other causes.  Weir further contends that both banks received
“uncollected interest,” which was interest that accrued on the defaulted loans and, as such, 
should be credited to him.  Under the loan agreements, the banks had no obligation to try to
collect any such interest, particularly because it was due from borrowers who had already
defaulted.
Our cases have fully discussed the issue of fraud loss, and we see no need to repeat
the relevant law here.  The District Court showed care and diligence over the course of an
entire year in attempting to resolve this particularly complex issue of loss.  Over the course
of the seven sentencing hearings, Weir successfully narrowed the number of banks
claiming loss from nine to two and decreased the loss figure from $929,494.94 to
$132,454.94.
8The court’s calculations were conservative.  Some relevant documents were
unavailable because one of the nine victim banks failed and another was unable to  provide
necessary documents.  However, the Government provided a representative sampling of
defaulted loans.  Weir was entitled to no more.
III.
Conclusion
We have considered all of the other issues raised by Weir and are not persuaded. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of sentence.
_____________________
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
______________________________
                                          /s/ Dolores K. Sloviter            
         Circuit Judge
